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#### The field of economics excludes native and black scholars at the level of form and content – at its outset academia weeds out participants via its whitened approach to teaching – introductory courses refuse to be relatable, encourage its students, or use accessible examples. Even if students continue despite the initial exclusion, native and black scholars are viewed with suspicion when interrogating the field from their social location. Instead, answer our call to apply the approaches of economists to quotidian violence

Bayer et al. 20 (Amanda Bayer; Professor of Economics @Swarthmore College, Gary A. Hoover; Professor of Economics @ University of Oklahoma, Ebonya Washington; Professor of Economics @ Yale College, “How You Can Work to Increase the Presence and Experience of Black, Latinx, and Native American People in the Economics Profession?”, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.34.3.193//af)

Welcome Broaden the Introductory Course **From the first contact that students have with economics, the field is off-putting**, respondents tell us. Some believe that the introductory courses are designed to “weed out” students from the major. Whether professors are doing this deliberately to decrease numbers or not, respondents point to theories and formulas devoid of applications as uninviting. The impact of these uninviting courses is not equal across student demographics. Bayer et al. (2020) find that minority (and women) students in introductory economics classes report significantly lower measures of relevance, belonging, and growth mindset; for example, they are less likely to agree that their professor uses relatable examples, to report feeling comfortable asking questions in class, to believe that people like them can become economists, and to believe that they could learn the material. Respondents recommend that introductory courses be more applied and that they include examples that are relevant to students from all backgrounds. In fact, nearly 75 percent of interview respondents cited an interest in public policy in explaining what first attracted them to economics. Says a recent undergraduate, Being able to connect what’s happened in the classroom with what a given student’s lived experience or question is, is extremely useful. . . . I personally know a lot of . . . people of color, who, I think personally, if economics was much more accessible, they would probably be economists because they’re interested in questions of, how do we fix the gender gap? How do we fix the racial disparities in education and wages? These are economics questions. A student who is now in an economics PhD program was hooked by being invited to critique the textbook models, Every time in class [the teacher] would say, “I’m going to show you this model[and] I want you to know that these are all of these assumptions baked into this model. . . . Every day you should ask yourself whether those assumptions are really true. . . .” And so, that got me thinking. . . . And I started realizing that I actually wasn’t that bad at math. I got to this point where I was like, oh wait, no, I’m proficient, I can probably do this. Another discouraging factor in one’s early years in economics is that, according to several respondents, professors give the impression that they are only interested in the top students. The same recent undergraduate advocating for more applied work above explained, “It’s like an ID card. Show your ID, show your A, ‘Okay, you get a letter. You get my attention.’ ” A respondent who graduated from college some time ago talked about how disheartening it was that he could not get a research assistant position on campus because all the positions had requirements for a minimum grade point average. Given that students come into college (and graduate school) with different prior academic experiences, have different rates and manners of assimilating information, and that there are types of intelligence invaluable to research that may not show up on an introductory microeconomics final, we do ourselves (and of course the students) a great disservice by eliminating them from consideration based solely on grades. Some students will come into an economics course (at the undergraduate or graduate level) with a strong network. Others will know no one and will therefore be at a disadvantage in completing coursework and studying for exams. Level the playing field by formalizing processes and taking across-the-board steps: share resources like copies of past exams universally, set up study groups for all students and encourage students to work collectively, and assign and guide graduate student advising. Students are receiving implicit and explicit messages about the identity of who belongs in the field. Counter those messages.6 Be upfront with students about the economics profession’s need to be more diverse and the messages of exclusion communicated by materials that omit or diminish the experience of minorities. Div.E.Q. at DiversifyingEcon.org (Bayer 2011) provides strategies for managing diverse classrooms. Call Out Bad Behavior The economics profession does not become more welcoming in graduate school and beyond. In fact, interview and survey respondents deemed it as “hostile,” “cutthroat,” and as previously stated, “elitist.” One associate professor describes her department’s treatment of graduate students as essentially their saying, “We’re going to pit you all against each other. We’re only going to support the top students. This is a fight to the death.”. . . The type of environment that’s in economics. I’m just going to be honest with you, I don’t think that a student who is an underrepresented student does well in that environment. I think that we tend to do well in a more supportive environment where we don’t feel so isolated. And about the profession in general, she continued, “The economics profession is brutal. Colleagues and students can be disrespectful, have implicit biases, and not understand the stress that being a minority economist entails.” There is a long history of economists from minority groups being pushed out, neglected, and undervalued. Examples include the experiences of Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander as the first African-American woman to receive a PhD in economics in 1921 (Malveaux 1991; Banks 2005) as well as the history of the National Economic Association (Simms and Wilson 2020) and the results of the recent AEA climate survey (Allgood et al. 2019). To create a more welcoming climate in economics for minority scholars, you can call out unacceptable behavior— racism, sexism, harassment of all types—when you see it and when it is reported to you. Your workplace (and our profession) needs clear policies and consequences for this behavior. The AEA Best Practice website (https://www.aeaweb.org/resources/best-practices) provides guidelines for developing such policies. More often than explicitly racist behavior, respondents had interactions that suggested more subtly expressed racial bias. The associate professor continues, [My white] colleagues or even other administrators, they don’t know that you have to deal with different layers. . . . I can say something, exactly the same as my white male colleague, but when I say it, I’m being a witch, or I’m mean, but they don’t deal with that. . . . So, I’m usually the first Black economist [my students have] ever seen. And that in and of itself has its own issues, like are you qualified? Are you competent? That’s what I mean is [my colleagues] don’t have to deal with [that] . . . and then when you do get eval[uation]s, . . . what [my chair] noticed was that when it comes to minorities, [the students] veer off [into] personality. He’s like, “I’ve never seen that with eval[uation]s of the white colleagues.”. . . They might like my class [but] they’d be like, “But I don’t like.” And it’s usually something really personal or how I dress. And he’s like, “I never see that with other colleagues unless they are . . . underrepresented minorities.” Other examples of this sort of subtle bias include differential treatment by colleagues, disrespectful interactions with supervisees or students, receiving more challenges and more interruptions from seminar audiences, and having one’s right to be in a certain job or location challenged. To make the economics environment more welcoming, you can raise awareness of the more subtle, but pervasive, biases too. Question whether evaluations, made by students or by colleagues, might be biased. Indeed, survey responses like ours along with the findings of large-scale studies led the AEA to recommend “Do not rely exclusively, or even primarily, on student evaluations of teaching to inform tenure and promotion decisions” (Bayer et al. 2019). Reduce the influence of remaining biases by standardizing processes such as job searches. Again, the AEA Best Practices website offers details (Bayer et al. 2019). Listen When asked what would improve diversity in the economics profession, an economist at a policy organization answered, I think people understanding that we are unique, and we all have different experiences. People being open to people talking about their experience and . . . actually hearing them. [I am] not saying that you have to agree with them. You don’t have to, that’s fine. But really listening to what people are saying that are from different backgrounds and saying like “Wow, I’ve never experienced that in my entire life but maybe that could be the case. And how can we talk about this?” And being more open about issues that minorities have. **Diversifying the profession means not just diversifying the hue of the skin of the people who do economics, but also diversifying the approaches, questions, experiences, and goals of economists**. Respondents asked to be heard on these differences, which shape both the substance of their work and their workplace experiences with implicit and explicit bias. Respondents also wanted to be heard by advisors whose help they would like in reaching research and career goals that are distinct from those of their advisors. For example, one PhD economist who is satisfied with her career in industry said, “If you’re in graduate school and you know you don’t want to be in academics, then there should be . . . someone telling you that’s okay; you don’t have to be an academic. You can go to industry.” Respondents want colleagues and department chairs to hear that service can be different for minority scholars, not only in terms of quantity of committees, but also in terms of intensity of the work. For example, minority faculty members frequently report more than their fair share of advisees, at least de facto, as minority students are eager to work with a minority advisor. Finally, respondents want to be heard in seminars and in other discussions of research including when they raise critiques through a racial lens, “Instead of being met with . . . not her again,” said a PhD student. The point is to listen actively to each individual’s particular concern, which may be quite distinct from yours, and then help to address it.7 Broaden the “Legitimate” Topics **More difficult than simply trying to raise certain ideas, respondents say, is trying to pursue them as research topics I think there’s a problem with this whole notion of . . . bringing new questions and new ways of approaching very established and old issues in economics.** People like to support, especially scholars of color, if they’re . . . echoing the mainstream and it’s harder and tougher when you’re not doing that. Respondents struggled to get the economics community to engage with work that was viewed as interdisciplinary in nature, was outside of the neoclassical paradigm, or that challenged economic dogma, among other topics. This played out for a current graduate student as follows, A lot of the research questions I had . . . as a first-year graduate student were kind of particular to my upbringing and the things that I experienced growing up and as a young adult. Early on, however, some faculty would always ask me to think about . . . my research questions’ value to other social scientists. This nudge led me to discard many of my initial motivations for pursuing a PhD, but at the time, I did not see this nudge as particularly evil. As I have reflected on this over the years, I realize that this nudge disproportionately affects minorities. **The social science community consists mostly of white males. . . . I’ll reiterate that these statements probably came from a good place. But in retrospect, faculty should avoid hindering potential research agendas because they are not interesting to white males**. Different backgrounds and lived experiences of course can lead to different research interests and insights (for example, Bayer and Rouse 2016; May, McGarvey, and Whaples 2014; Malmendier, Nagel, and Yan 2017). Respondents report that advisors and mentors particularly discourage graduate students and early stage minority researchers away from topics related to race or other aspects of their identity, which are the topics that in many cases drew the young researchers to economics in the first place. **There is a perception that Black scholars studying Black people or Latinx scholars studying Latinx people or Native American scholars studying Native American people may be biased or taken less seriously as scholars**. (Of course, this critique is never made of white men scholars studying white men.) Sadly, this double standard has not changed across the years. A full professor who earned her PhD several decades ago says that because of a nudge away from identity, her early work was “totally sexless and ethnicness-less” and it was 20 years before she began studying a topic that she enjoys and has been productive in, a topic related to her background. Many underrepresented minorities are drawn to economics research because they find the existing research to be problematic or lacking in some fashion.8 We imagine that advisors and mentors suggest against certain topics because they believe that conference organizers, journal editors, and hiring and tenure committees will not be appreciative of them. Thus, **the gatekeepers in the economics profession need to take a broader view of legitimate economics research**.

#### Specifically, settler colonialism studies has been monopolized by white scholars – paving over native grammars with intelligible concepts of land, sovereignty, and dispossession is discursive genocide – erases attempts of Native and Black studies to reconcile over the language of genocide

Patel et al. 15 (Shaista Patel, Assistant Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC San Diego, Ghaida Moussa, PhD in the Social and Political Thought Program at York University, Nishant Upadhyay, Assistant Professor of Ethnic Studies at University of Colorado-Boulder, “Complicities, Connections, & Struggles: Critical Transnational Feminist Analysis of Settler Colonialism,” https://feralfeminisms.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ff\_issue4.pdf//af)

I’m hesitant in answering this question because my “motivation” wavers. Writing editorials feels like saying “I was here too…This whole time, **I was here too behind these pages that other brilliant people wrote. I chose them, I read them, I asked them to change things**… I hid behind them, but I was there too, and yet, now, I don’t know what to say, I don’t know if I should say it, I don’t know why I got into this in the first place.” I was tempted to write this editorial as a list of 100 questions, but hiding behind these questions seemed evasive in the face of a deeper question: **“How do I write when I have nothing brilliant to say?”** While part of me feels like turning back because these conversations are complicated and contentious and I’m a young scholar who is predisposed to saying all the wrong things… I feel like there is more at stake by not having these conversations. I’ll start with why I feel pulled by this conversation, why I want to invite it and why I deem that, although my experiences, thoughts, or knowledge are not singular or special in any way, engaging in these questions seems necessary to me at this point in time. I teach and learn in most of my waking hours and I still believe that the work that we do as scholars—as tainted and constrained as it can be and often is—is meant to matter, when it either fails or succeeds, or when, more often than not, it both fails and succeeds. The title of co-editor that I have taken up refers mostly to my role in deeming the questions and themes laid out in this issue and the people engaging in them important enough to be featured in conversation. My awareness and politicization concerning settler colonialism and violence targeting Indigenous peoples more broadly is perhaps more recent than some. **Living on someone else’s land was always my experience here as a racialized immigrant, but not until pretty late in my life did I start to know of this land as Indigenous land.** I grew up in a very white neighborhood in Québec and we weren’t taught much in school about Indigeneity, colonization, settler colonialism, or even race, for that matter. My politicization around violence against Indigenous people came in tandem with my politicization on other issues such as sex, gender, class, and race. These were still pretty basic understandings—not until two years ago, in the context of a graduate seminar, did I become aware of dynamics that placed Indigenous people and people of colour in any type of relationship. It forced me to rethink dynamics beyond me/whiteness, Indigenous peoples/whiteness, all the while still being aware of the settler-colonial white-supremacist context in which I live. I am still very much wrapped in the complexity of this shift. And while this story isn’t about me or my journey, I think it’s important not to erase this point-of-entry because it has been formative of the motivation behind this issue. To a large extent, too, after reading Lawrence and Dua (2005) and Sharma and Wright’s (2009) articles, now widely used as academic entry points into this conversation, I’ve felt that there is little space to engage critically with these texts. In the academic context, I have experienced fixations over the terms “settler of colour” and pre-formulated and deep-seated arguments in favour of one text or the other. I hear people who whole-heartedly agree and whole-heartedly disagree and very little honest conversation that leaves room for complexity or for asking what possibilities these conversations are opening and closing. My role as a coorganizer for the “Decolonizing Anti-Racism” Social and Political Thought conference at York University in 2014 added to this questioning. For instance, how can we hold both complicity and common grounds as two presences that sometimes cancel each other out, sometimes fuel alliances, and other times are used to uphold each other? How are white settlers using current discourses to further marginalize and oppress racialized people by acting as gatekeepers or “good confessional settlers”? How is recognition of complicity acting as a substitute for, technique, or absolvent of something beyond recognition? How are the politics of language signifying “good and bad politics” and limiting when and how we speak of what needs to be spoken about? How do some “critical” subjects gain currency and value and what does it mean when critical theory aligns with state policies? What makes this subject so contentious that never in my years in academia have I seen more heated debates than on the question of people of colour being settlers (and how is this fixation perhaps taking away from a larger project that was intended by the introduction of this idea in the first place)? Most importantly, how do we move beyond self-reflection and acknowledgement towards that something more that is needed? I hoped that this issue might bring some answers to these questions or more importantly open up discussions that are complex and un-easy (if not unsafe) to answer. In this way, my hesitation for engaging is my motivation to engage. Nishant: After the 2014 Social and Political Thought graduate conference at York University, Ghaida approached me to be part of the project. Apart from the excitement to work with Ghaida and Shaista on what sounded like an exciting and a much-needed project, the impetus to join was also to bring in a critical engagement with race into the analysis of settler colonialism. For the last few years I have tried to engage, both in the academy and outside, as to what it means to be a racialized, brown, queer, upper-caste South Asian person on stolen lands. As nonIndigenous, non-Black, and non-white persons in the white-settler state, our presence here is often ambiguous, contested, and contradictory. As we discuss below, not all people of colour are situated similarly and homogenously in the settler state. Furthermore, these complexities and contradictions need to be worked out and race needs to be understood more rigorously within the mechanics of white-settler colonialism. **I am not saying scholarship and activism on and against settler colonialism has effaced questions of race**. Rather, I want to say the questions have not been taken up as urgently by people of colour. For Indigenous scholars, activists, and artists, the materialities and struggles against settler colonialism and white supremacy are different and we need to recognize those differences. **Within the academy, and often outside, white people have taken a monopoly on questions of settler colonialism.** I think the recent rise in settler-colonial studies is a testament to that. White scholars and activists are given much more credibility for doing this work than even Indigenous scholars. We know that community organizing and resistance led by Indigenous women and two-spirit folks continually goes unrecognized, whereas academic and “solidarity” work by white folks gets valorized and celebrated. **The domination of settlercolonial studies by white academics and activists erases Indigenous scholarship and the scholarship of people of colour and Black people that challenges settler colonialism and white supremacy through other disciplines.** Indigenous scholarship is not settler-colonial studies, even though Indigenous scholars may work within it. As people of colour, we need to find ways to engage more with Indigenous and Native studies rather than with settler-colonial studies. For me working on this issue is a way of seeking new ways of theorizing race within settler colonialism, even if a bit over-ambitiously.

#### According to the origin story that settler colonialism says about itself, its genesis is indebted to Patrick Wolfe and other Australian scholars – centering White theorists shifted the conversation to a focus on sovereignty, subjectivity and settlement while pushing out Black studies attempts at co-theorization

King 19 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University, “The Black Shoals: The Offshore Formation of Black and Native Studies”, <https://read-dukeupress-edu.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/books/book/2617/The-Black-ShoalsOffshore-Formations-of-Black-and//af>)

Before settler colonialism was established as a field of study, around 2005–2006, robust yet imperfect discussions were occurring between Black and Indigenous communities.87 These partial and evolving conversations relied on literature emerging from Native studies and Black diaspora studies.88 While I do not want to suggest that these texts are sufficient in and of themselves or that the work being done in settler colonial studies is without value, **I do want to critically scrutinize how settler colonial studies has become the preferred discourse for examining Indigeneity, relations to land and space, and questions of sovereignty.** Why was Native studies usurped and abandoned as the disciplinary lens from which to pursue these questions? Why is Black studies an unlikely place to pursue notions of sovereignty and nation (or the impossibility of sovereignty and nation)? What can be made from shared Native and Black discursive and extradiscursive moments? Unlike White settler colonial studies, Black studies (particularly Afropessimism) and Native studies sustain a steadfast focus on abolishing genocide and avoid reflexive analogies and detours through humanist modes of thought and expression. Further, **settler colonial studies invisibilizes historical and ongoing discussions between Black and Indigenous communities and Black and Native studies**.89 Within existing White settler colonial discourses the extended elucidation of the settler and their concerns interrupts examination of the violence of the slave trader and serial murderer of Indigenous peoples. In the book The Empire Writes Back (2002), Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin include a (very) small section that focuses on settler colonies and their literature. In their examination of literary production in settler colonies, the colonized subject is imagined as the White subject writing back to and resisting the colonial power of the metropole.90 Almost no Indigenous literature is mentioned as a form of anticolonial discourse.91 In a very short section, the authors define settler literature as White settlers’ attempts to distinguish themselves through language and writing from Britain as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. This method became the frame for thinking about postcolonial thought in the settler colonies. However, The Empire Writes Back attends to literary forms and thus does not anticipate the consolidation of settler colonial studies as a specialized field of critical theory. It was too early for the authors to comment on the “settler colonial turn” that was about to take form. However, their focus on White literary cultural production forecasts who would be centered in the emerging discourse of settler colonial studies.92 The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century marked a moment in which women of color scholarship and activism were growing in popularity. Within the academy and social justice organizing, the rubric of violence unified a number of constituents nationally and globally. Organizing against interpersonal and state-sanctioned violence became the suture that connected an international movement of gender, prison abolition, anti-imperial, and anticolonial activists. The World Trade Organization protests, post-9/11 immigrant rights organizing, reproductive justice work, and the 2000 protests of the stolen U.S. presidential election were animated to some extent by the antiviolence movement led by women of color. At the epicenter of this organizing, the enigmatic Andrea Smith emerged as one of the antiviolence movement’s most prominent faces.93 Prominent Indigenous activists and scholars—such as Madonna Thunder Hawk, Stormy Ogden, Winona La Duke, and Sandy Grande—and their theories of violence became flash points of a movement that centered the ways that imperial and colonial violence continue to perpetuate themselves in multiple forms across the globe. Largely due to the increased attention that women-of-color coalitional work, along with Smith’s and Native women’s scholarship, was receiving, Native feminist thought began to circulate widely and garner U.S. and international acclaim. The theoretical and discursive axis in the academy—American, Ethnic, Women’s, and Gender studies—and in activist circles tilted and rotated around the body of scholarship being produced by Native and women of color in the United States. Texts such as The Sacred Hoop, From a Native Daughter, Inventing the Savage, Red Pedagogy, Conquest, and The Color of Violence, which elaborated on colonization’s connection to other forms of racialized and gendered violence, were the major sources consulted for theorizing the historical and contemporary violence of coloniality in the overlapping scholar-activist circles in the early twenty-first century.94 On the heels of the popularity of feminist texts by women of color and Native women, the scholarship of White scholars in White settler states began to gain traction and currency as a countercurrent.95 The late Patrick Wolfe’s book Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology was published in 1998, and his essay “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native” (2006) was often the text circulated first and most widely. The essay recycled the book’s statement that “invasion is a structure, not an event,” which would be quoted and cited widely over the next five to six years and into the present.96 Wolfe’s Foucauldian-influenced theorization (both structuralist and poststructuralist) of settler colonialism as a structure (diffuse, omnidirectional, and productive) appeared to have inspired a reanimation of White scholarship on processes of settlement, subject formation, land theft, and colonization in the settler states of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. In 2010, Cavanagh and Veracini announced on their blog the need for, and emergence of, a new field of study devoted to settler colonialism as a unique and irreducible form of domination.97 **According to the origin story that settler colonial studies tells about itself, the body of knowledge that marks it as a distinct area of studies emerges in the 1990s, primarily out of Australian settler scholarship**. As an area of studies, it regards settler colonialism as a “distinct social, cultural and historical formation with ongoing political effects.”98 Its genesis is indebted to the intellectual labor of the Australian scholars Wolfe, Cavanagh, and Veracini. In 2010–11, Settler Colonial Studies launched its debut issue. With an open-access journal, the field has the infrastructure and capacity to travel transnationally and gain appeal. As a transnational theoretical movement, it travels from Australia and New Zealand to Canada, South Africa, the United States, and other imperial European sites. Wolfe is regarded as the seminal figure in the field and continues to in fluence the burgeoning North American field of settler colonial studies. While scholars in Native studies do acknowledge the explicit attempts that Wolfe made to develop the analytics of settler colonialism in relation to “Indigenous thinking and scholarship that exists far longer than settler nations,” **his work has been used in ways that often end up consolidating settler colonial studies as a White field that displaces Native and Indigenous studies**.99 In 2006, Wolfe made the compelling case that settler colonialism was a more appropriate theoretical frame and structure from which to think about power in settler states. He argued that settler colonialism is larger than genocide and is the best way to conceptualize the elimination of the Native in settler societies. As I mentioned, Wolfe theorized settler colonialism as a “structure” rather than an “event.”100 As a structure, settler colonialism is an ongoing process that can contain other formations; thus, settler colonialism—and its logic of elimination—looms much larger than genocide. Wolfe proclaimed, “To this extent, it is a larger category than genocide.”101 Using a similar logic, my project argues that conquest is a larger conceptual and material terrain than settler colonialism and far more suited for the regional/hemispheric particularities of coloniality in the Americas. As the unique (and productive) social and theoretical concerns of oceanic settler-Indigenous relations traveled transnationally and landed in North America, some of the particular historical legacies and contemporaneous machinations of relations of conquest were effaced and disappeared. **The uncritical adoption of settler colonial discourses from an oceanic context enacts a discursive shift that privileges a theoretical and ethical engagement with settlers, settlement, and settler colonial relations**. Together, **this works to displace conversations about genocide, slavery, and the violent project of making the human** (humanism). In 2011, in a series of posts that ran through 2017, the Lenape scholar Joanne Barker tried to slow the rapidly moving tide of White settler colonial studies by posting a set of provocations that exposed the limits of the analytic of settler colonialism. In “Why Settler Colonialism Isn’t Exactly Right” on her Tequila Sovereign blog, Barker expresses concern with the etymology of “settlement” and what it connotes and calls forth as a form of political discourse.102 She is disturbed by how the term “settle” refers to actions such as reconciling and “making friends.” More specifically, the term connotes and encourages a “reconciling of these histories”—of White imperial violence and indigenous death and subjugation—“within the current structure and social formation of the nation-state.”103 Barker contends that settler colonialism does not capture “the current structure or social formation of the U.S.”104 In fact, Barker prefers to hold on to “harsher terms” such as imperialism and colonialism because they facilitate a more precise understanding of current militarized violence and support people who are strategizing for “empowerment and revolution.”105 Barker sustained and nuanced this analysis, and even engaged in a dialogue with Wolfe and Mark Rifkin in the spring of 2011, over the course of nine blog posts. In 2017, Barker levied another critique of the field for its structuralist rigidity and inadvertent erasure of Black people. In the post “The Analytic Constraints of Settler Colonialism,” she works through “a certain analytic within the studies [that] has, however unwittingly, foreclosed and even chilled understandings of Black and Indigenous histories and identities in ways that derail our understandings of U.S. imperialism as a social formation and so our work with one another.”106 Because settler colonial studies—and, more specifically, Wolfe’s formulation of invasion as a structure—performs like a “Marxist structuralist” problem for thought, it “rearticulates the problematics of structuralism. It treats society as a fixed, coherent thing that can be objectively described.”107 As a fixed and coherent “thing,” the settler state and its structure of invasion are states to negotiate, reconcile with, and reform rather than abolish. Further, due to the structuralist limitations of the discourse of settler colonialism, Barker struggles to think about or situate movements such as #BlackLivesMatter, #SayHerName, #NoDAPL, and #MMIW as contemporary oppositional politics that could be in coalition with one another under a settler colonial regime. More important, she is concerned about the political implications of a settler colonial studies whose decolonial imaginary renders “reparations” and “return” antithetical political objectives without merit.108 **Informed by a Black studies perspective that continues to be in conversation with Indigenous studies and people, I contend that the danger of the hegemonic hold White settler colonial studies has on the imagination of critical theory is that it actively disavows quotidian forms of anti-Black and anti-Indigenous violence and resurrects the violence of liberal humanism, even as it engages post-Enlightenment thought and poststructuralist critique**. **The field of White settler colonial studies has yet to truly reckon with the ways that it erases Indigenous knowledge and forms of Indigenous politics of decolonization that require the end of the U.S. and Canadian nation-states as well as the end of Whiteness and the versions of the human that sustain them.** The prominence of Settler colonial studies itself as a key analytical turn in the social sciences and humanities performs a form of genocidal violence as it displaces Indigenous and Native studies. **Also, the field reproduces a rigid settler-Indigenous binary that erases Black people and anti-Black violence from its analytical frames**. When the field attempts to insert Blackness through an applied intersectional rhetoric of inclusion, it makes this “structural adjustment” by incorporating Black people into the analytic as settler-laborers.109 This misnaming of Black people as both settlers and laborers occurs in part because of the field’s reliance on liberal humanist conceptual and theoretical frames inherited from continental theory. Finally, the focus of settler colonial studies on the human rubrics and idioms of land and labor invisibilizes Black political attention and focus on murder, Black fungibility, and the call for the abolition of the deadly terms on which the human and the world were crafted.

#### Debate replicates the actions of academia via the misrecognition of genocide as “settlement” and native thought as “land-centered pedagogy” is mimicked by non-native usurpation of natives in debate as “give back the land” which pushes native debaters to identify themselves at the site of coherent intra-human conflict.

Brough 17 (Taylor, BA from University of Vermont and 2016 CEDA Nationals Champion, Open letter to non-Black Native people in debate, <https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/> //af)

I should start by saying that I think Frank Wilderson is right about the position of Native people in the US racial schema. In Red, White, and Black, he argues compellingly that Native people are situated in a liminal space between life and death—that we are haunted by the dual specters of sovereignty and genocide; that our demands occur simultaneously in a coherent register of land repatriation, land theft, and treaty rights and in an incoherent register of an incomprehensible and ongoing magnitude of massacres, rape, starvation, boarding schools, and smallpox. Wilderson’s work has provided me with some of the tools to describe the gap between coherence and incoherence, a gap which is made especially evident in debate rounds. And particularly clear is that Native debate[[1]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn1) is inclined towards talking in the grammar of sovereignty rather than genocide.

I am here preoccupied with our enunciative capacities in debate—with what I perceive “Native debate,” and specifically non-Black Native debaters, to be doing in service of Settler/Master (mis)recognition, what the consequences of such doing might be, and what it might mean to push against the disciplining force of recognition in debate. The ontological fact of genocide/sovereignty as a dual positioning for Native people, coupled with academia’s push to identify ourselves at the site of (coherent and recognizable) trauma (what Wilderson terms “intra-human conflicts”), has led Native thought in debate, broadly, to do three related things: 1) prioritize the coherent discussion of sovereign loss over one of genocide and its incoherence, 2) articulate ourselves as always in conversation with (read: traumatized by) the Settler, 3) distance ourselves from a Black/Red conversation or from Black/Red theorizing. These three moves are all antiblack in addition to being an insidious manifestation of the genocide that structures half of our (non?)being.Depressingly, if we were to historicize “Native debate,” we would have to begin with a litany of non-Native debaters reading “Give Back the Land,” offering sovereignty as a solution to a tragic history of genocide that relegates Native people to phobic/phillic objects of the past whose futures are in the hands of those Settlers who bravely dare to talk about them. The terrain in which everyone can become Native—or at least become an advocate for Natives—is a cleared landscape produced by genocide but also, significantly, produced by antiblack slavery.[[2]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn2) This history of non-Native debaters’ representations of sovereignty, land repatriation, and treaty rights as the only solution to genocide also reaches into the present. What is most disturbing to me about this ongoing history is that we have yet to tie virtually any debate round to actual, material land repatriation, sovereign gains, or the upholding of treaty rights. These material gains involve labor from Native people organizing at the grassroots level, not an academic labor from Settlers. Debate arguments do not facilitate sovereign benefits for Native peoples. Further, the struggle for sovereignty itself does not overcome or solve genocide. The removal of the Hunkpapa Lakota Oyate and their relatives at the Oceti Sakowin camp at Standing Rock should be proof enough of this—sovereignty as a politic is often met with, rather than resolving, genocidal violence. Non-Black Native people in debate have performed a similar land-based politic. **Native debate has become** so **associated with words like “land,” “sovereignty,” “space,”** “place,” “treaty rights,” and others, **that it is** almost **impossible to theorize Native debate absent sovereignty** as a grammar that marks our existence. So **both non-Native** debaters (who claim to advocate for Native peoples’ sovereignty) **and Native debaters** (who claim to advocate for something that usually falls into the grammar of sovereignty) a**re talking in essentially the same register, with incredibly limited slippage towards genocide as a vector of violence.** And, for Native people, like non-Natives, debate arguments do not and cannot facilitate the material elements of decolonization that these land-based arguments frequently rely upon.[[3]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn3) Sovereign gains don’t happen in debate rounds, but for some reason the (mis)recognition of Native enunciation as sovereignty persists, in that the word “land” harkens to Native debate in almost every instance, that almost every debate involving Native people reading perceptibly “Native” arguments includes a discussion of “treaties” or “sovereignty” or “land-based pedagogy” or “spatiality.” What other reason could this be than a structure of desire around recognition from the Settler/Master? If we really follow the history of how “Nativeness” has been misrepresented in debate by Settlers, it becomes clear that much of contemporary Native debate, strangely (or as I argue, not so strangely), mimics these misrepresentations. Of course, debate is an economy of (mis)recognition. That “Native” becomes coextensive with “land” in debate is no accident. It is an enunciation that has been evoked prior to the involvement of any Native debaters or coaches. And it is reiterated by non-Black Native debaters with increasing certainty about the truthiness of Native relationships to the land. **Systematically absent from this conversation, of course, is a discussion of genocide**. I have gestured above towards the ways that the desire for recognition from the Settler/Master motivates this conceptual move towards the register of sovereignty. As Wilderson writes,“The crowding out, or disavowal, of the genocide modality [by the sovereign modality] allows the Settler/’Savage’ struggle to appear as a conflict rather than as an antagonism. This has therapeutic value for both the ‘Savage’ and the Settler: the mind can grasp the fight, conceptually put it into words. To say, ‘You stole my land and pilfered and appropriated my culture’ and then produce books, articles, and films that travel back and forth along the vectors of those conceptually coherent accusations is less threatening to the integrity of the ego, than to say, ‘You culled me down from 19 million to 250,000.’”[[4]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn4) This gesture towards conceptual coherence and therapeutic value is why there is a celebrated and ongoing association between “land” and “Native” in both non-Native argumentation and in arguments made by Native people. It is why we cannot theorize about Native debate absent the contingent register of sovereignty. I am hesitant to claim that sovereignty should be completely abandoned as an analytic for obvious reasons—I think Wilderson also gives credit to indigenous conceptions of sovereignty, what it unseats, and how it operates, while still articulating a critique of sovereignty unrivaled by much of Native studies. I am not interested in suggesting that all Native people ignore our peoples’ land relationships or histories of broken treaties as politic throughout the United States or the world. I agree with Qwo-Li Driskill’s suggestion, alongside similar ones from other Native theorists, that sovereignty must be re-theorized significantly rather than echoing the propertied enterprise that confers legibility to state formations. Regardless of my reluctance to disavow the potential for sovereignty as a politic outside debate rounds, I think it is obvious that sovereignty in its terms in debate—as a recognized and fundamentally “Native” utterance—is genocidal and anti-Black. Broadly, my argument is that genocide is an undertheorized arm of an antagonism that halfway positions Native people, and that the basis of such undertheorization is the desire to be (mis)recognized as nearly-Human by the Settler. This claim invites an investigation of the context of (mis)recognition in debate and what is particular about debate itself with regard to Wilderson’s theory of position. Debate is inevitably a space of recognition, coherence, and transparency. It seeks to uncover, make clear, and expand consciousness more than it promises to occlude, hide, or make incoherent. This condition of debate is significant not because that makes it different from the rest of the academy, or the rest of civil society, but because it offers a specific situation from which to apply the critique of recognition. In the age of academic identity politics, the identification of the self as a subject of trauma has emerged as the primary locus of (recognizable) enunciation. Many who are familiar with Eve Tuck’s work have read her critical analysis on the academy’s demand for damage-centered narratives and the kinds of traumatized neoliberal subjectivity they produce—as those who are continually indebted to a parasitic regime of recognition. When this critique is applied in debate, it frequently targets identity-politics models of intervention in academia which posit the traumatized subject as a primary locus of critique. For example, many of the ableism debates I’ve judged contained arguments locked entirely in this register—where the traumatized subject is itself offered as a structural analytic in a manner that is always parasitic on Blackness. Teams who read arguments that they refer to as “disability pessimism” and describe disability as a form of “ontological death” often go on to claim that no change has come from reading critical arguments in debate and that we should be pessimistic about the ability for debate to become more inclusive of disabled people. This is, at best, an appropriation of Afropessimism based on a reductive reading of Black debate. Significantly, the misrecognition of Black debate that is rearticulated through “disability pessimism” also includes the secondary claim that critical argumentation has not produced shifts in the institutional schema of debate. But “disability pessimism” would not exist without Black debate. You can’t bite Afropessimism and then disavow the intellectual labor of Black people as the condition of possibility for your argument. Worse still, “things have never changed in debate for disabled people,” is not an advocacy. It is just a recognized enunciation of the trauma of degraded subjectivity. In this example, the degraded subject masquerades trauma as analysis while occluding structural phenomena. They merely say, “The world is a horrible and traumatizing place for me, therefore listen to me reiterate my trauma.” And more often than not, as Eve Tuck writes, “All we are left with is the damage.”[[5]](https://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/" \l "_ftn5) These so-called interventions posited by identity politicians are ineffective in that they fail to provide a solution to a problem that they have misidentified because of their own egoistic (contingent) investments. In other words, in an instance of identity politics, where trauma must be isolable, human, subjectified, and coherent in order to be validated as authenticity by the Settler/Master, sovereignty gets the job done in a way genocide does not. Again, it is the assumption that recognition by the Settler/Master is favorable, or even necessary, that motivates Native people’s investments in arguments about land, space, place, sovereignty, and treaties. It is also this assumption that facilitates the false move to authenticity (false in that it is only given coherence by a genocidal and antiblack apparatus of recognition). Native people have been (mis)recognized by the Settler/Master since Taino peoples were met with Columbus’ genocidal misrecognitions in 1492. Much of this (mis)recognition rests on the incoherence of genocide. “Genocide is not a name for violence in the way that ‘arson’ is; genocide is a linguistic placeholder connoting that violence which out-strips the power of connotation. To represent it we have to dismantle it, pretend that we can identify its component parts, force a name into its hole—macrocytes, spur cells, kidneys at half-throttle, a thoroughly ulcerated stomach, Wounded Knee, Sand Creek—and make it what it is not, the way one fills the tucked sleeve of a one-armed boy. But these fillers, these phantom limbs of connotation, can only be imagined separately, and as such they take on the ruse of items that science, love, aesthetics, or justice—some form of symbolic intervention—can attend to and set right. They become treatable, much like the massacre at Wounded Knee were it not for the fact that to comprehend Wounded Knee, three hundred-plus men, women, and children in a snow-filled ravine, one must comprehend those three hundred synchronically over three thousand miles (the forty-eight contiguous states) and diachronically over five hundred years. Here, madness sets in and the promises of symbolic intervention turn to dust. We are returned to the time and space of no time and space, the ‘terminal.’”[6] The magnitude of this hole—the impossibility of representing or narrativizing how genocide as a modality continues to position not just Native peoples but the extent to which it is a structural principle of modernity itself—is not easy. It is certainly not as easy to articulate in a debate round as sovereign loss is, nor is it as easy for Settlers to hear. In order to no longer occlude the emergence of Red/Black theorizing in debate, non-Black Native people in debate must begin speaking in the register of incoherence, which demands engaging conceptually and argumentatively with Black people in debate. The avoidance of such a conversation (or series of conversations) can only be rooted in antiblackness and will only reproduce antiblackness. While Native people can be recognized by the Settlers we are talking to in the register of sovereignty, structurally, Black people (including people who are Black and Native) have no such register at the level of ontology. “Whereas Humans exist on some plane of being and thus can become existentially present through some struggle for, of, or through recognition, Blacks cannot reach this plane.”[7] The simultaneous coherence and incoherence of the “Savage” position has thus far led non-Black Native people collectively to invest ourselves in antiblack kinship relations in debate that refuse to speak to or with Black people except when using them as a scapegoat to gain recognition from the Settler/Master institution of debate. This is because, more often than not, non-Black Native debaters are only tasked with talking to Settlers. I don’t mean this in terms of whether we have white friends—I mean argumentatively and conceptually, our work is creating a Settler/Native binary that conspicuously erases and systematically under-theorizes Blackness, antiblackness, slavery/prison, and Black people. Too many non-Black Native debaters don’t even have an answer to the question of whether Black people are Settlers. That there are Native debaters who feel ambiguous about this question at all suggests the rootedness of Native debate in antiblackness. It is beyond the scope of this letter to offer specific critiques of the myriad of (inadequate) ways that many non-Black Native scholars claim to “position” “Blackness,” but it is overwhelmingly true that their discussion of antiblackness consistently describes it as a system of racial identification subservient to settler colonialism. In debate, however, this neglects the indebtedness of non-Black Native debaters to the intellectual and argumentative labor of Black debaters, coaches, and judges. In other words, to reduce antiblackness in debate to a system of racial identification subsumed structurally by settler colonialism is ahistorical, given that it has been the work of Black people in debate that has made Native debate possible at all, as tenuous and numerically small as we are. Why, then, are non-Black Native people in debate so invested in describing settler colonialism as the sole matrix of power under which violence operates? Much of this scholarship (Eve Tuck’s work, Jodie Byrd’s, and other similar texts from Native studies) critiques integrationist elements of Black studies as seeking inclusion in the national project—but Afropessimism broadly, and Wilderson’s work specifically, is far from integrationist. To my knowledge (which is extensive but obviously not exhaustive when it comes to Native debate), non-Black Native debaters have been largely unwilling to contend with the thesis of Wilderson’s book, even when reading other scholars who allege disagreement with him, as most of these scholars do, from the vantage point of sovereignty. A coherent conversation with the Settler about sovereignty in debate is unlikely to challenge the (mis)recognition that leads to the high level of politicization around who is really Native and who is not. Similarly, the numeric lack of Native people in debate, as a function of genocide itself, makes it difficult to articulate what Native resistance has been, is going to be, or even what it is doing right now. Rather than an aspirational politic that suggests we should culturally infuse debate with indigeneity (the implicit endpoint of many of these conversations about “decolonization” which are ultimately revivalist and inclusionist attempts related to Native spiritual or cultural practices), there is an (under-theorized) incoherence to our position that I believe should motivate us to enter into the fraught terrain of Red/Black theorizing. Nothing Native is happening in debate—not that there are not Native people in debate, but I do not believe debate is a space that we should aspire to “indigenize,” “decolonize,” or anything in that register. In debate, Native people are misrecognized, whether through technologies of capture like blood quantum mythologies, misreadings of indigenous cosmologies, or genocidal imaginations of Noble Savages. Fuck non-Black non-Native people who are structurally responsible for those misrecognitions. To the degree that recognition is inevitable in debate, I think many of us are pushed by our coaches, debate partners, by those who judge us, and by civil society more broadly, to articulate ourselves within those frames in order to authenticate ourselves. This is my analysis of trauma politics above. How does the register of authenticity change when we are talking to someone other than the Settler/Master and their junior partners? I believe it changes significantly. I believe that for Native debate to a) increase meaningful Native participation in debate,[8] b) attend to the irreconcilable genocidal question that for us always undergirds sovereignty but can never be coherent in the way that sovereignty and land loss can, and c) attend to social death and the non-position of the Black, it is imperative that we stop talking to and for white people argumentatively.

#### Refusal is a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged and renders transparent how conquest underlies the abstracted knowledge of “neutral” instrumental propositions – examining the converging places of Native and Black studies are the ideas unacknowledged.

King 17 (Tiffany Lethabo King is currently an Assistant Professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight. Source: Critical Ethnic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 162-185. Published by: University of Minnesota Press. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162. Accessed: 02-08-2017 22:58 UTC //shree)

Within Native feminist theorizing, ethnographic refusal can be traced to Audra Simpson’s 2007 article, “On Ethnographic Refusal.” In this seminal work, Simpson reflects on and gains inspiration from the tradition of refusal practiced by the people of Kahnawake.14 Simpson shares that Kahnawake refusals are at the core and spirit of her own ethnographic and ethical practices of refusal. I was interested in the larger picture, in the discursive, material and moral territory that was simultaneously historical and contemporary (this “national” space) and the ways in which Kahnawakero:non, the “people of Kahnawake,” had refused the authority of the state at almost every turn. The ways in which their formation of the initial membership code (now replaced by a lineage code and board of elders to implement the code and determine cases) was refused; the ways in which their interactions with border guards at the international boundary line were predicated upon a refusal; how refusal worked in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that “this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights.”15 Because Simpson was concerned with applying the political and everyday modes of Kahnawake refusal, she attended to the “collective limit” established by her and her Kahnawake participants.16 The collective limit was relationally and ethically determined by what was shared but more importantly by what was not shared. Simpson’s ability to discern the collective limit could only be achieved through a form of relational knowledge production that regards and cares for the other. Simpson recounts how one of her participants forced her to recognize a collective limit. Approaching and then arriving at the limit, Simpson experiences the following: And although I pushed him, hoping that there might be something explicit said from the space of his exclusion— or more explicit than he gave me— it was enough that he said what he said. “Enough” is certainly enough. “Enough,” I realised, was when I reached the limit of my own return and our collective arrival. Can I do this and still come home; what am I revealing here and why? Where will this get us? Who benefits from this and why? And “enough” was when they shut down (or told me to turn off the recorder), or told me outright funny things like “nobody seems to know”— when everybody does know and talks about it all the time. Dominion then has to be exercised over these representations, and that was determined when enough was said. The ethnographic limit then, was reached not just when it would cause harm (or extreme discomfort)— the limit was arrived at when the representation would bite all of us and compromise the representational territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years.17 Extending her discussion of ethnographic refusal beyond the bounds of ethnographic concerns, Simpson also ponders whether this enactment of refusal can be applied to theoretical work. Simpson outright poses a question: “What is theoretically generative about these refusals?”18 The question that Simpson asks in 2007 is clarified by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang in the 2014 essay “R- Words: Refusing Research.” Arguing that modes of refusal extended into the theoretical and methodological terrains of knowledge production are productive and necessary, Tuck and Yang state: For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative, expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned. Unlike a settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is petulantly exasperated and resentful of limits, a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing.19 In line with Simpson’s intervention, Tuck and Yang posit that “refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory.”20 For Tuck and Yang, a generative practice of refusal and a decolonial and abolitionist tradition is making Western thought “turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon.”21 In fact, the coauthors suggest “making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of . . . research.”22 What this move effectively does is question the uninterrogated assumptions and exposes the violent particularities of the metanarrative. Scrutiny as a practice of refusal also slows down or perhaps halts the momentum of the machinery that allows, as Tuck and Yang argue, “knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life.”23

#### Black and Native communities under conquest are already death-bound but the shoal functions as a space of liminality, indeterminacy, and location of suture between two seemingly contradictory frames that have been sealed off from each other

King 19 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University, “The Black Shoals: The Offshore Formation of Black and Native Studies”, <https://read-dukeupress-edu.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/books/book/2617/The-Black-ShoalsOffshore-Formations-of-Black-and//af>)

In addition to rethinking Black epistemologies and conceptual ecologies, I also use the shoal as a way of moving Black diaspora studies to reconceptualizing Indigenous people as also connected to water and the oceanic. Vincente Diaz, a scholar of Pacific Island communities that constitute Oceania, works within seafaring epistemologies (ocean travel, chant, moving islands) to honor the ways that “land, sea and humans are mutually constitutive of one another.”35 Taking into consideration the “very long history of geo and oceanographic dispersal” and travel, Diaz’s work, as well as other Pacific Islander Indigenous scholars, challenge notions of Indigenous “rootedness” in static time and space.36 Thinking with Indigenous mobilities, migrations, and relationships to the sea, I hope to engage an important proposition that Seneca scholar Mishuana Goeman poses. More specifically, Goeman asks, what might “forms of analysis or action” that center “indigenous conceptions of land as connected, rather than land as disaggregate parcels at various European-conceived scales” of accumulation look like?37 Colonial European scales disaggregate space into reservations, nation-states, continents, hemispheres, and water. Goeman offers that we “position land and water as always connected.”38 Goeman asks, “what if we think of waterways in the way my Pacific Islander colleagues, particularly Vincente Diaz and Alice Te Punga Somerville, have positioned waters as connected with the currents rather than water as that which divides continents, islands, and land?”39 For Goeman, Somerville, and Diaz, “the binding of land and water to the political, cultural and social life of indigenous peoples requires an ethics of care and responsibility.”40The Black Shoals is a site where Black studies connects land and water. **The shoals also represent an analytical and geographical site where Black studies attempts to engage Native studies on ethical terms that unfold in new spaces**. This project tracks where and how Blackness interrupted the linear and smooth flow of modern and postmodern thought on the questions of slavery and genocide. Ultimately, this book asks, What changes does the Black shoal require of normative routes and knowledge systems that consider the ways that Black presence in the Americas casts a shadow on and informs the projects of genocide, settlement, and the remaking of “the human” under ongoing relations of conquest? As an accumulation of Black thought, aesthetics, and politics, the shoals of this project halt the all too smooth logics of White settler colonial studies. More specifically, **The Black Shoals arrests settler colonialism’s tendency to resuscitate older liberal humanist modes of thought to create new poststructural and postmodern forms of violent humanisms that feed off Indigenous genocide and Black social death.** The shoals as the analytical, theoretical, and methodological sandbars in this book place White settler colonial studies, as well as certain tendencies within Indigenous/Native studies (and Black studies) that align with White humanist thought, under stress. The Black Shoals forces a tarrying within hemispheric Black studies’ discourse of conquest and its traditions of interrogating the terms on which the human comes into formation through Black and Indigenous death in the Western hemisphere. At this contemporary juncture, many Black and Indigenous people in this hemisphere experience the current political moment as one marked by mass carnage. Everyday life is marked by grotesque interludes with Black and Indigenous death in the streets or in the plains. Even as Black and Indigenous people and the world bear live witness—on the street, Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook—to the real-time murder of their kin and relations, liberal political commentary, the academy, and the White left continue to use a form of speech that refuses to name the quotidian spectacle of death as conquest. The way that shoals slow the movement and momentum of vessels acts as the organizing metaphor that structures the theoretical frame of the book. **The Black shoal functions as a critique of normative discourses within colonial, settler colonial, and postcolonial studies that narrowly posit land and labor as the primary frames from which to theorize coloniality, antiIndigenism, and anti-Black racism.** The Black Shoals introduces an alternative reading practice and an analytical suture or thoroughfare that reveals the ways that Blackness mediates the relations of conquest in the Western Hemisphere. The Black Shoals works to disrupt the movement of modern thought, time, and space to enable something else to form, coalesce, and emerge. An essential analytical move that shapes the theoretical contributions of The Black Shoals is how the book uses a hemispheric approach that exceeds conventional Black diasporic analytics and spaces. Throughout the book, the space of the hemisphere, which includes the westernmost coast of Africa and the Americas, functions as the landscape in which the practice of enslaving Black people and making them fungible and accumulable symbols of spatial expansion happens alongside and in relationship to Indigenous genocide. Very much as Brathwaite’s “tidalectics” as performed in Caribbean and Black diaspora literature moved between the experiences of dispersal and landing, the analytical approach of this book traces the relationship and dialogic traffic between Black and Indigenous thought in the hemisphere.41 Brathwaite’s tidalectics, which lap up against Glissant’s archipelagic thought and poetics of landscape, produce what McKittrick identifies as “different sets of geographic tools . . . which are anchored, primarily in nonlinearity, contradictory histories, dispossession, and an infinite variety of landscapes.”42 Tidalectics as a mediation between the sea and land tends to privilege geographies and analytical sites such as the dock, stelling, and liminal spaces that are an intermediary location between ocean and shore. It is also an analytical location that forecloses settlement and permanent landing on its always shifting and dissolving terrains. Rather than read these ruptures, dissolving and ephemeral spaces suspiciously, I encourage the reader to engage the nontraditional geographies (visible, uncharted, and invisible) that connect Indigenous and Black diasporic thought reparatively.43 The theoretical frame of the book gathers, much like shoals gather, disparate granules of sand, rock, and coral to make new and varied theoretical formations within Black diaspora studies. While some of the theoretical pairings may seem disparate and sound dissonant, their placement in conversation with one another produces a generative friction. More important, the scholarly voices that I have curated for this project all ask important questions about how the human—or its apex, Man—is defined in relationship to Black and Indigenous people. In the theoretical formation that is the Black shoals, readers will recognize the sand mounds and coral patterns of Wynter, Spillers, and McKittrick, as well as Saidiya Hartman, Frank Wilderson, and Denise Ferreira da Silva. Their bodies of work contribute to a lineage and legacy of scholarship that arrests the normative epistemic flow and the violence of the narrativity of humanist (or what Wynter calls “monohumanist”) thought. While the book recognizes that the authors and the respective traditions from which they are a part and help form (Caribbean studies, Black and African diaspora studies, U.S. Black studies, Black Canadian studies, Afro–Latin American and Brazilian studies) address specific and unique challenges that arise at the level of the nation-state and supranational regions, the book refuses to silo or treat the intellectual traditions as bounded. Black studies in its Caribbean, Canadian, U.S, Brazilian, North American, and Latin American iterations all shift and respond to one another (albeit unequally) like living shoals that are connected to one another like an archipelago. **Rather than conflate distinct intellectual formations**, traditions, and practices of study, **I trace the nerves of a** gathering or **shoaling** (however fleeting and temporary that it may be) **of a Black diasporic and hemispheric conversation about** middle passages, geographies, rootless relations to nation-states, and **encounters with Indigenous peoples amid the violence of New World modernity**. I attend to the violence of conquest in Anglo imperial regimes and nation-states that connect Black people in the Western Hemisphere. I also attend to the ways that Black people who are subject to the legacy of this violence have always been trying to communicate with Indigenous people. Each tradition and practice of Black study has its own approach to configuring and enfleshing the spaces and cracks where Black and Indigenous life caress each other. In the Anglo North American academy, Black Canadian studies—which continues to demand institutional resources and recognition—has sustained the most explicit and intentional exchange with Indigenous people, genocide, and the discourse of settler colonialism as evidenced by their scholarly imprint. Canadian racial discourses prioritize the settler-Indigenous binary and subordinate—erase—the nation’s own history of slavery and anti-Black racism through a Canadian project of multiculturalism that focuses on assimilating (Black) immigrants into its national project.44 Because of the way that the Canadian nation-state organizes and narrates its racial conflict and reconciliation along settler and Indigenous lines, Black Canadian studies has a long and established record of theorizing racial violence and through a triadic European-Native-Black frame. Further, the influence of Black diaspora studies, particularly a practice inflected by Anglo-Caribbean Studies in Toronto, privileges an Afrodiasporic tradition with a long history of studying and critiquing coloniality. The influence of Caribbean philosopher Wynter is evident in the work of Black Canadian scholars like Rinaldo Walcott, whose essay “The Problem of the Human: Black Ontologies and ‘the Coloniality of Our Being’” (2014) limns the limits of a settler colonial critique in the face of anti-Black racism. In “The Problem of the Human,” Walcott draws on the Wynterian tradition of studying the violent enclosures of the human in order to elaborate the ways that the Canadian nation-state’s project of multiculturalism expands to incorporate modes of Indigenous representation into its notion of the human/Man at the expense of Black subjects in Canada.45 In comparison, U.S. Black studies’ engagement with Native studies and Indigenous sovereignty as a political and intellectual project, while longer, has been less even and consistent. U.S. racial discourse tends to be organized by a White-Black paradigmatic frame that often erases Indigenous peoples. When U.S. Black studies has engaged Indigenous thought and politics, the field has been less likely to articulate Black-Indigenous relations through a discourse of settler colonial relations until recent, twenty-firstcentury scholarship.46 Tracking the history of Black popular and scholarly treatments of the subject of Native America, scholar Arika Easley-Houser has discovered an antebellum African American print culture in which Native Americans figured centrally in the nineteenth-century African American imagination.47 These print cultures ranged from those that sought to explore alliances with Native peoples to comparative projects that tried to prove African American superiority to Native peoples, as well as those that investigated Native practices of enslavement.48 Shortly after founding the Association for the Study of African American Life and History (asalh) in 1915, Carter G. Woodson published his article “The Relations of Negroes and Indians in Massachusetts” in the Journal of Negro History in 1920. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the first Black studies programs producing scholarship at the nexus of Black activism and the development of academic departments created fertile ground for conversations between Black and Native scholars and activists. With the establishment of Black studies departments, a noticeable uptick in scholarship by Black scholars on Black and Native American relations emerged after Powhatan-Renape scholar Jack D. Forbes’s Africans and Native Americans: The Language of Race and the Evolution of Red-Black Peoples was published in 1993. In the first decades of the twenty-first century, scholars began to pay particular attention to the practice of slavery among the Five Civilized Tribes. In 2006, Tiya Miles and Sharon Holland coedited the anthology Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds: The African Diaspora in Indian Country. The contributors to the collection used a variety of interdisciplinary methods and rooted their work in primary sources, archival records, and Black and Native literary traditions that told stories of Black and Native relations in North America. In the wake of Miles and Holland’s Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds, Frank B. Wilderson authored one of the first interdisciplinary Black studies texts that introduced a theoretical frame for elaborating the complex structural and ontological—political economic and libidinal—positions of Black and Native people in the United States. Caribbean and Latin American studies’ attention to complicated processes of racialization and identity formation like creolization and mestizaje refract Blackness and Indigeneity differently from Black North American racial frameworks. Blackness and Indigeneity do not function as frequently as bounded ancestries, identities, or ontological positions. However, Anglo-Caribbean scholars such as Shona Jackson and Melanie Newton have noted that in the Anglo Caribbean, anticolonial and postcolonial national origin stories often erase Amerindian presence through a Calibanesque tradition that indigenizes African-descended people.49 However, Black and African diaspora scholarship that emerges from the Caribbean and from Central and South America directly engages questions of coloniality from theoretical and experiential perspectives. For example, Sylvia Wynter’s body of work, which traces the “epistemic revolutions” of Western humanism, attends to the ways that Black (Niggers) and Indigenous (Indios) identities are made and remade as a perpetual limit point or outside to the boundaries of Man across various colonial formations. Wynter’s critique of humanism and its systems of overrepresentation has functioned as a crucial pivot point in Black studies that has enabled the emergence of a shared critique to emerge between Black and Native Studies. A Black studies reading practice that attends to African diaspora studies as they unfold in the Caribbean and South America has the conceptual space to acknowledge philosophical, literary, and historical traditions that can attend to histories of both enslavement and colonialism. Despite these different and, at times, divergent tendencies in each respective Black tradition of study, factions within each tradition have sustained unique and meaningful conversations with Indigenous peoples and Indigenous/ Native studies on their own terms. As a way of eroding (while attending to specificities of) nation-bound approaches for tracking Black and Indigenous dialogue, I turn to Black diasporic methods. More specifically, I rely on Gilroy’s analytic of the Black Atlantic as a way to track mobile and shifting diasporic thought, activism, and aesthetics that engage Indigenous people.50 At times, the diasporic movement will travel with and identify Black and Indigenous dialogue at the level of the nation, the region, the hemisphere, or imagined spaces that exceed all of these geographical scales. Diasporic itineraries and thought act as methods and practices of study that present other frames for attending to Black diaspora people’s engagement with Indigenous people.

#### Refusal is informed by a misanthropic skepticism of the overrepresentations of Man as human or post-human that diverges from civil and procedural protocols.

King 17 (Tiffany Lethabo King is currently an Assistant Professor in the Institute for Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight. Source: Critical Ethnic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 162-185. Published by: University of Minnesota Press. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/jcritethnstud.3.1.0162. Accessed: 02-08-2017 22:58 UTC //shree)

Native feminist politics of decolonial refusal and Black feminist abolitionist politics of skepticism informed by a misandry and misanthropic distrust of and animus toward the (over)representation of man/men as the human diverge from the polite, communicative acts of the public sphere, much like the politics of the “feminist killjoy.”4 Throughout this article, I deploy the term “feminist” both ambivalently and strategically to mark and distinguish the scholarly tradition created by Black and Native women, queer, trans, and other people marginalized within these respective communities and their anticolonial and abolitionist movements.5 Until a more useful and legible term emerges, I will use “feminist” to mark the practices of refusal and skepticism (misandry/misanthropy) as ones that largely exist outside more masculinist traditions within Indigenous/Native studies and Black studies. “Decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” depart from the kinds of masculinist anticolonial traditions that attempt to reason Native/ Black man to White Man within humanist logic in at least two significant ways. First, neither participate in the communicative acts of the humanist public sphere from within the terms of the debate. Further, they do not play by the rules.6 Specifically, the Native and Black “feminist” politics discussed throughout launch a critique of both the logic of the discussion about the human and identity as well as the mode of communication. In fact, practices of refusal and skepticism interrupt and flout codes of civil and collegial discursive protocol to focus on and illumine the violence that structures the posthumanist discourse. Attending to the comportment, tone, and intensity of an engagement is just as important as focusing on its content. The particular manner in which Black and Native feminists push back against violence is important. The force, break with decorum, and style in which Black and Native feminists confront discursive violence can change the nature of future encounters. Given that Black women who confront the logics of “nonrepresentational theory” are really confronting genocide and the white, whimsical disavowal of Black and Native negation on the way to subjectlessness, it is understandable that there is an equally discordant response. Refusal and skepticism are modes of engagement that are uncooperative and force an impasse in a discursive exchange. This article tracks how traditions of “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” that emerge from Native/Indigenous and Black studies expose the limits and violence of contemporary nonidentitarian and nonrepresentational impulses within white “critical” theory. Further, this article asks whether Western forms of nonrepresentational (subjectless and nonidentitarian) theory can truly transcend the human through self- critique, selfabnegation, and masochism alone. External pressure, specifically the kind of pressure that “decolonial refusal” and “abolitionist skepticism” as forms of resistance that enact outright rejection of or view “posthumanist” attempts with a “hermeneutics of suspicion,”7 is needed in order to truly address the recurrent problem of the violence of the human in continental theory. While this article does not directly stake a claim in embracing or rejecting identity per se, it does take up the category of the human. Because the category of the human is modified by identity in ways that position certain people (white, male, able- bodied) within greater or lesser proximity to humanness, identity is already taken up in this discussion. Conversations about the human are very much tethered to conversations about identity. In the final section, the article will explore how Black and Native/Indigenous absorption into the category of the human would disfigure the category of the human beyond recognition. Engaging how forms of Native decolonization and Black abolition scrutinize the violently exclusive means in which the human has been written and conceived is generative because it sets some workable terms of engagement for interrogating Western and mainstream claims to and disavowals of identity. Rather than answer how Native decolonization and Black abolition construe the human or identity, the article examines how Native and Black feminists use refusal and misandry to question the very systems, institutions, and order of knowledge that secure humanity as an exclusive experience and bound identity in violent ways. I consider the practices and postures of refusal assumed by Native/Indigenous scholars such as Audra Simpson, Eve Tuck, Jodi Byrd, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith to be particularly instructive for exposing the violence of ostensibly nonrepresentational Deleuzoguattarian rhizomes and lines of flight. While reparative readings and “working with what is productive” about Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s work is certainly a part of the Native feminist scholarly tradition, this article focuses on the underexamined ways that Native feminists refuse to entertain certain logics and foundations that actually structure Deleuzoguattarian thought.8 Further, I discuss “decolonial refusal” in relation to how Black scholars like Sylvia Wynter, Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, and Amber Jamilla Musser work within a Black feminist tradition animated by a kind of skepticism or suspicion capable of ferreting out the trace of the white liberal human within (self- ) professed subjectless, futureless, and nonrepresentational white theoretical traditions. In other words, in the work of Sylvia Wynter, one senses a general suspicion and deep distrust of the ability of Western theory— specifically its attempt at self- critique and self- correction in the name of justice for humanity— to revise its cognitive orders to work itself out of its current “closed system,” which reproduces exclusion and structural oppositions based on the negation of the other.9 Wynter’s study of decolonial theory and its elaboration of autopoiesis informs her understanding of how the human and its overrepresentation as man emerges. Recognizing that humans (of various genres) write themselves through a “self- perpetuating and self- referencing closed belief system” that often prevents them from seeing or noticing “the process of recursion,” Wynter works to expose these blind spots.10 Wynter understands that one of the limitations of Western liberal thought is that it cannot see itself in the process of writing itself. I observe a similar kind of cynicism about the way the academic left invokes “post humanism” in the work of Jackson and Musser. Musser in particular questions the capacity of queer theories to turn to sensations like masochism within the field of affect studies to overcome the subject. Further, Jackson’s and Musser’s work is skeptical that white transcendence can happen on its own terms or rely solely on its own processes of self- critique and self- correction. I read Jackson’s and Musser’s work as distrustful of the ability for “posthumanism” to be accountable to Black and Indigenous peoples or for affect theory on its own to not replicate and reinforce the subjugation of the other as it moves toward self- annihilation. Both the human and the post human are causes for suspicion within Black studies.

#### This results in a re-thinking of thinking that problematizes spatial logics of objective mastery

**Marzec 1** (Robert, Teaches Postcolonial Studies @ SUNY Fredonia, An Anatomy of Empire, symploke 9.1-2 (2001) 165-168, muse//shree)

Retrieving crucial foundational shifts in history that determine the order of existence in our present marks the first aspect of this archival study of empire, or, to use Spanos's term, "anatomy." The second involves the interrogation of not only accepted discourses, but cutting-edge movements of critical thought as well, an aspect of scholarship that good cautious scholars take as a principal charge. In the work of Edward Said, for instance, Spanos traces a movement of thought that inadvertently leads to a major oversight in the field of postcolonial criticism empowered by Said's insights. Fleshing out the influence of colonization along the full continuum of being, Spanos throws into relief the repercussions of Said's emphasis on geopolitical imperialism and subsequent failure to give full weight to the ontological origins of occidental imperialism. This gesture enables Spanos to reveal the extent to which **the relay of imperial ideologies is enabled by a** centuries-long **colonization of the notion of "truth" itself**, a colonization governed by **a logic of mastery** that stems from Imperial Rome and **that "derives from thinking being** meta-ta-physica ["above," "beyond," or "outside" **things** in contextual, **temporal flux**]." Similarly, Spanos finds it highly disabling that **critics have come to take** Foucault's emphasis on the period of **the Enlightenment as** evidence for concluding this moment in history to be **a "mutation" in thinking resulting in Western Imperialism** proper." Consequently, **postcolonial theory** in general heedlessly **contributes to a failure to consider the full jurisdiction of imperialism**. The widespread impulse to emphasize the period of the Enlightenment as if it were the cradle of true imperial practices is symptomatic of the very disciplinarity that Foucault calls into question. This reconfiguration of critical thought enables Spanos to "unconceal" the ontological force of American contemporary imperialism, and to resituate the war in Vietnam as an event that reveals the violent metaphysical imperative of "mastering" informing the idea of America. In constructing his counter-memory archive, Spanos finds the origins of this impulse to master reality in the Roman transformation of Greek thinking. **The** early Greek **thinking of being as** temporal **and** groundless (notable in philosophers such as Parmenides and Anaxemander) **undergoes a hardening process that results in the** colonization of lived events **for purposes of intellectual manipulation**: the Greek logos as legein (words) is transformed into Logos as Ratio (the Word of Reason); **the agonistic** Greek [End Page 166] **understanding of truth** as a-letheia **is annulled in favor of** the Roman circumscription of **truth as correctness** (veritas). More than a challenge to accepted periodizations of imperialism, Spanos's compelling insight here shows how colonization begins at the site of thought itself, that it has been a way of thinking holding dominion for far longer than commonly considered. **Thinking**, he reveals, **has come to be governed by an impulse to reify being as a** thoroughly controlled spatial image, "a 'field' or 'region' or 'domain' to be comprehended, mastered, and exploited" (191). **This change** naturalizes and universalizes an instrumentalism **that transforms the "uncalculability of being" into** a utility, into a "world picture" that can be grasped in a technological age that conceals the nothing at the heart of the social order for purposes of reducing being to a disposable commodity. Consequently, the instability and **the antagonism offered by** the heterogeneity disseminated by **the movement of temporality is re-presented as a problem to be** surmounted and eventually "solved" with the imposition of "a final and determinate solution" (191). **The power** of this triumph **of instrumentalist thinking lies in its ability to throw** all **foundational inquiry into oblivion**. In its ubiquity, this instrumentality affects the very people attempting to offer opposition to the dominant order, for within the problematic of contemporary criticism, **one is** either characterized as **engaging in** a form of **"high theory" that** uses a language that **fails to speak to the world** at large, or **one resists by taking** "real political action." Thus, ontological analyses are doubly ostracized. This constitutes an incredible handicap to oppositional thinking in the post-Cold War era. Spanos writes: [F]or an opposition that limits resistance to the political, means a time of defeat.

But **for the oppositional thinker** who is **attuned to** the **ontological exile** to which he/she has been condemned by the global triumph of technological thinking **it also means the recognition that this exilic condition of silence constitutes an irresolvable contradiction in the "Truth" of instrumental thinking** --the "shadow" that haunts its light--that demands to be thought. In the interregnum, **the primary task of the** margin-alized **intellectual is the re-thinking of thinking itself** . . [I]t is the event of the Vietnam War--and the dominant American culture's inordinate will to forget it--that provides the directives for this most difficult of tasks not impossible. (193) This "silencing" of an ontological engagement--what Heidegger referred to as "the forgetting of being"--parallels the silence surrounding the event of Vietnam on the part of American media and the intellectual deputies of the dominant Cold-War culture. If represented at all in the dominant American imaginary, the war appears as an embarrassment, a failure on the part of America to maintain its exceptionalist national self-image that has been part of the character of American identity as far back [End Page 167] as the Puritan "errand in the wildnerness." This prevailing view of Vietnam--made manifest most explicitly when President George Bush announced that the American people had "kicked the Vietnam syndrome" by "winning" the Gulf War--is part and parcel of the reigning philosophical view of the American order: **the Hegelian-informed view that we have reached the "end of history" with** the form of **democracy** known **as "free-market" capitalism** (an economy of ordering that not only governs Western nation-states, but seeks to rule "Third World" cultures as well). Having "reached the end" **implies that one has** solved and **mastered the contradictions hindering the socio-political domain**, that one "stands above" the fray and movement of difference. It is at this point that we come to see Spanos's most significant contribution to critical inquiry. His building of a counter-memory archive, through the refusal to separate the ontological from the sociopolitical, enables him to reveal the full reign and power of an American exceptionalism that presents itself as benign. The power of this current order of reality lies in its ability to separate the many "sites" that constitute the continuum of being. By presenting Vietnam, free-market democracy, Puritanism, the Hegelian "end of history," and the Roman transformation of Greek thinking as unrelated, the order disables the critical thinker from "unconcealing" the depth of its control. **This disciplined split**--the logic of the "interregnum"--**continues to consume** and disable **the full potential of resistance**. The split afflicts the most formidable thinkers, even Spanos's own intellectual master guides, Heidegger (who's emphasis on ontology overlooks the socio-political) and Foucault (who's primary focus on the socio-political register generates its own blindness to the power of ontological domination). **Questioning this logic of the interregnum demands** what one would hope scholarly research to always offer as a matter of course--**a reconsideration of the ways in which we think in the present**. **This requires that the scholar who wishes to rub against the imperatives of the interregnum rethink the very movement of thought**. In that rethinking we must confront without apology the increasing rapaciousness of not only the self-congratulatory nature of American rhetoric, but the growing, insidious neo-imperial movement of transnational corporations that have come to extend the logic of mastery beyond national borders. As such, living in the interregnum presents the critical scholar with a singular intellectual burden--one, according to Spanos, "most difficult but not impossible."

#### Refusal shouldn’t mean concessionary neglect or claiming a separate space for articulation—that locks in the self-marginalization of indigeneity

Dei 2 (George Sefa, Professor of Sociology and Equity Studies@ Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, “Rethinking the Role of Indigenous Knowledges in the Academy,” The Research Network for New Approaches to Lifelong Learning, <http://www.nall.ca/res/58GeorgeDei.pdf> //George)

Ultimately, we have to consider the role of Indigenous knowledges in the academy as primarily one of ‘resistance’ to Eurocentrism; that is, resistance to the dominance of Eurocentric knowledge as the only valid way of knowing. It is resistance to Eurocentricism masquerading as a universal body of thought. I interpret resistance as referring to the social actions and practices of subordinate groups (and their allies) that contest hegemonic social formations and knowledges, as well as unravel and dislodge strategies of domination (Haynes and Prakash 1991: 3). Kellner (1995: 42) cautions against the ‘fetishization of resistance’. Abu-Lughod (1990) also reminds us of “...the tendency to romanticize resistance, to read all forms of resistance as signs of the ineffectiveness of systems of power and the resilience and creativity of the human spirit in its refusal to be dominated” (cited in Moore, 1997:89). My use of resistance is closer to Parry’s (1994) who points to Frantz Fanon and Amy Cesaire’s work and their “...unwillingness to abstract resistance from its moment of performance” (p. 179) [cited in Moore, 1997: 89]. Moore (1997) correctly alludes to the “...importance of historical, cultural and geographical specificity to any understanding of resistance” (p. 89). He further understands the limitation of placing the focus on the ‘intentions’ of, rather on than the consequences of, everyday human action and social practice (p. 89). Moore (1997) holds that we must explore alternative conceptions of resistance, “...[r]ather than measuring resistance against a yardstick of widespread social and political economic transformation, the micro-politics of tactical manoeuvers... [take] center stage” (p. 90). In other words, we must view resistance in the academy as collective actions and strategies for procedural and incremental change. Resistance starts by using received knowledges to ask critical questions about the nature of the social order. Resistance also means seeing ‘small acts’ as cumulative and significant for social change. As one of my Caribbean-born, African graduate students wrote, “...I can’t tell you how affirming it is to see ‘patois’ in the books I am evaluating for my thesis. A few years ago, this would never have been possible...The fact that these languages make their way into texts at all is a phenomenal act of resistance. Of course, I realize that the use of local languages outside their appropriate contexts opens up a whole new set of challenges” (Lawson 1998). In thinking of Indigenous knowledges as ‘resistance knowledge’ we must acknowledge how easy it is to be complicit in the reproduction of hegemonic Eurocentric and colonized knowledges in the academy. By failing to speak out about Indigenous knowledges we have become complicit in the continued marginalization and negation of such knowledges in the academy. The integration (that is, centering) of Indigenous knowledges into the curricular, instructional and pedagogical practices of Western academies cannot be an unquestioned exercise. We must consider how power-saturated issues of academic social relations are used to validate different knowledges to serve particular interests. Of course, we must also be wary and critical of the integration of Indigenous knowledges into the academy if it is pursued to serve the interests of the modern state and corporate capital. We must be concerned about the exploitative tendencies of Western academies in order to affirm the status quo. Indigenous knowledges should be critical and oppositional in order to rupture stable knowledge. However, our caution and cynicism should not lead to us to claim a separate space for Indigenous knowledges in/outside the academy. We must be careful that our academic practice and politics do not feed on the marginality of Indigenous knowledges. Maintaining a separate space for Indigenous knowledge feeds on the problematic idea that Indigenous ways of knowing/knowledges sit in a pristine fashion outside of the effects of other bodies of knowledge. In fact, varied knowledge forms belong in the academy. Hence, we must understand our individual and collective academic complicities in creating this marginality by our failure to speak about multiple knowledges in curricular, instructional, pedagogic and textual practices. We must center the varied, alternative and sometimes oppositional discourses and knowledges systems in our academic communicative and pedagogical practices.